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Groups are a ubiquitous aspect of  human exist-
ence (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). We are born and 
raised in families, learn in classrooms, socialize in 
friendship groups and communities, and often 
work in teams. One of  the reasons that work is 
done in teams is that the resources available to 
a team are superior to those harnessed by a sin-
gle individual (Wegner, 1987). These additional 
resources allow group performance to exceed that 
of  a single individual in most task domains (Davis, 
1969; Larson, 2010). The vast amount of  research 
on group performance shows that groups, 
although rarely performing at their full potential, 
typically perform as well or better than individu-
als on most tasks (Hill, 1982; Hinsz, Tindale, & 
Vollrath, 1997; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Thus, 
groups are used in many key aspects of  both 
public (e.g., parliaments, cabinets, juries, etc.) and 
private (e.g., task forces, corporate boards, focus 
groups, etc.) life.
Good and bad group performance: 
Same process—different outcomes
R. Scott Tindale,1 Christine M. Smith,2 Amanda 
Dykema-Engblade3 and Katharina Kluwe1 
Abstract
Much of  the research on small group performance shows that groups tend to outperform individuals 
in most task domains. However, there is also evidence that groups sometimes perform worse than 
individuals, occasionally with severe negative consequences. Theoretical attempts to explain such 
negative performance events have tended to point to characteristics of  the group or the group process 
that were different than those found for better performing groups. We argue that typical group 
processes can be used to explain both good and bad group performance in many instances. Results 
from a pair of  experiments focusing on two different task domains are reported and used to support 
our arguments.
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Groups do not always perform well, however. 
There are many tasks where groups are inappro-
priate, or at least extremely inefficient (e.g., writing 
a poem). And without appropriate resources, even 
well designed teams may fail (Hackman, 1998). 
But even well-resourced groups with knowledge-
able members sometimes will make poor (even 
disastrous) decisions (Janis, 1982). Incidents like 
the space shuttles Challenger and Columbia explo-
sions and the failed Bay of  Pigs invasion are exam-
ples of  poor group decisions. In each case, groups 
of  experts had made or supported the decisions 
even though, allegedly, information was present 
that should have led them to decide otherwise 
(Nijstad, 2009). Such decisions are often blamed 
on poor decision processes. Probably the most 
well-known description of  dysfunctional group 
decision processes is Janis’ (1982) groupthink. 
Based on a number of  case studies, Janis defined 
multiple aspects of  groupthink including high 
cohesiveness, directive leadership, poor informa-
tion search, and sanctions against dissent. 
Although there is now evidence that poor infor-
mation search and sanctions against dissent can 
impede group performance under some circum-
stances (see Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, 
Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007; Postmes, Spears, & 
Cihangir, 2001), neither insures that groups will 
do poorly. In addition, most evidence argues that 
high cohesiveness and directive leadership often 
aid group performance (Mullen & Copper, 1994; 
Perterson, 1997). Thus, the research evidence to 
date has not been particularly supportive of  
groupthink either as a phenomenon or an expla-
nation of  poor group performance (Baron, 2005; 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004).
Recent theorizing has begun to explore how 
basic group processes can be used to explain both 
good and poor group performance in different 
contexts (Brodbeck et al., 2007; Kerr and Tindale, 
2004; Tindale, Talbot, & Martinez, in press). In 
the current paper, we argue that two rather basic 
and quite common aspects of  group consensus 
processes can be used to explain many instances 
of  both good and poor group performance. Both 
aspects can be seen as instances of  what we 
have referred to as “social sharedness” (Kameda, 
Tindale, & Davis, 2003; Tindale & Kameda, 
2000). Social sharedness is the idea that task-rele-
vant cognitions (broadly defined) that the mem-
bers of  a group have in common, or share, exert 
a greater influence on the group than do similar 
cognitions that are not shared among the mem-
bers. The cognitions that are shared can vary 
from preferences for decision alternatives or 
information about the alternatives to heuristic 
information processing strategies that the mem-
bers cannot even articulate. However, the greater 
the degree of  sharedness for a particular task rel-
evant cognition, the greater the likelihood that it 
will influence the group decision. In general, we 
will argue that social sharedness is often adaptive 
and probably evolved as a useful aspect of  living 
in groups (Kameda & Tindale, 2006; Kameda, 
Wisdom, Toyokawa, Inukai, 2012). However,when 
the shared cognition is inappropriate to the cur-
rent situation, it can lead groups to make poor 
decisions.
The current research focusses on two types or 
levels of  social sharedness: Shared preferences 
and shared task representations (Tindale, Smith, 
Steiner, Filkins, & Sheffey, 1996). Shared prefer-
ences refer to the degree to which members of  a 
group prefer a particular decision alternative. 
Numerous studies have shown that the size of  a 
faction favoring a particular alternative is a good 
predictor of  the likelihood that the group will 
choose that alternative, and that the largest fac-
tion defines the group consensus most of  the 
time (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; 
Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990). 
Thus, a majority/plurality decision model (or 
social decision scheme – SDS, Davis, 1973) does 
relatively well in predicting group decision out-
comes on a variety of  tasks. Table 1 shows the 
SDS representation (the social decision scheme 
matrix, D; Davis, 1973) for a majority wins pro-
cess for a six-person group. It also shows a pro-
portionality SDS that represents the probability 
of  group decision outcomes as identical to the 
proportion of  members that initially favored the 
alternative. A proportionality model provides a 
good baseline for studies comparing individual 
and group decision making since it predicts group 
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and individual preference distributions to be 
equivalent. As can be seen in the table, any time 
four or more individual favor a given alternative 
(A or B), a majority model predicts the group will 
choose that alternative.
Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of  
the group choosing alternative A for both the 
majority and the proportionality models as a 
function of  the probability that a randomly sam-
pled individual from the population from which 
group members would be drawn would choose 
A. Given the proportionality model functions 
as the individual choice baseline, the figure 
shows that when individuals are likely to choose 
A, a group employing a majority-wins process 
exacerbates this tendency and is even more likely 
to choose A. Under the assumption that A is the 
correct or optimal alternative, majority-wins 
groups should perform better than the average 
individual anytime the individual choice probabil-
ity for A is greater than .5. However, if  individual 
preference probabilities favor B, then majority-
wins groups will choose A less often than indi-
viduals, thus performing more poorly.
The second aspect of  social sharedness rele-
vant to the current research involves what we 
have called “shared task representations” (Tindale 
et al., 1996). Tindale and colleagues defined a 
shared task representation as “any task/situation 
relevant concept, norm, perspective, or cognitive 
process that is shared by most or all of  the group 
members (Tindale et al., 1996, p. 84). “Task/situ-
ation relevant” means that the representation 
must have implications for the choice alternatives 
involved, and the degree to which a shared repre-
sentation affects group decision processes and 
outcomes will vary as a function of  its perceived 
relevance. Its influence will also vary by the 
degree to which it is shared among the group 
members—the greater the degree of  sharedness 
(the more members who share it), the greater its 
influence.
Probably the best example of  shared task rep-
resentation is the first component of  Laughlin 
and Ellis’ (1986) definition of  a demonstrable 
task—a task where group members can demon-
strate during group discussion that a particular 
alternative is “correct” or “optimal”. Laughlin 
(1999) has argued that one of  the reasons that 
groups are better problem solvers than are indi-
viduals is that group members often share a con-
ceptual system (i.e., a shared task representation) 
that allows them to realize when a proposed solu-
tion is correct within that system. This shared 
conceptual system, or background knowledge, is 
what allows a minority member with a correct 
answer to influence a larger incorrect faction to 
change its preference to the correct alternative. 
Such situations are well described by SDS models 
called “truth wins” and “truth supported wins” 
(Laughlin, 1980; see Table 2). Truth wins predicts 
that any group that has at least one member with 
Table 1. Social Decision Scheme Models for Majority 
Wins–Otherwise Equiprobability and Proportionality
Individual 
distributions
Group distributions
 Majority Wins 
– Equiprobability 
Otherwise
Proportionality
A–B A B A B
6–0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
5–1 1.00 0.00 0.87 .013
4–2 1.00 0.00 0.67 .033
3–3 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2–4 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67
1–5 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.87
0–6 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
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Figure 1. The probability of  the group choosing A 
as a function of  individual choice probabilities for 
both Majority Wins–Otherwise Equiprobability and 
Proportionality Social Decision Schemes.
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the correct answer will be able to solve the prob-
lem correctly (Lorge & Solomon, 1955; Laughlin, 
1980). Truth supported wins argues that at least 
two members of  the group must have the correct 
answer in order for the group to solve the prob-
lem correctly (Laughlin, 1980). Figure 2 presents 
the relationship between individual and six- 
person group decision preferences (for alterna-
tive A which is assumed correct in the present 
context) under both a truth wins and truth- 
supported wins SDS. In both cases, the group 
probability of  choosing the correct response 
increases more rapidly than the probability of  an 
individual choosing the correct response. The 
probability increase for groups under the truth 
wins model is considerably steeper than the 
increase for the truth supported wins model, but 
both curves show that groups will virtually always 
out-perform individuals when correct minority 
faction can convince incorrect majority factions 
to switch their preferences to the correct alterna-
tive. However, if  one were to assume that the 
shared task representation favored an incorrect, 
rather than a correct, alternative (assume alterna-
tive A is incorrect), then Figure 2 would represent 
an “error wins” process and groups would rarely 
if  ever outperform individuals.
Research has shown that shared task represen-
tations do not always favor normatively or objec-
tively correct or optimal alternatives (Hinsz, 
Tindale, & Nagao, 2008; Tindale, 1993). Using 
problems where individuals tend to make intui-
tively appealing but incorrect judgments, groups 
often show biases in the same intuitive but incor-
rect direction. Hinsz et al. (2008) asked individuals 
and groups to respond to base rate neglect prob-
lems similar to the “cab problem” employed by 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). In this problem, a 
witness to a hit and run accident says the cab 
involved was green, but there are only two colors 
of  cabs in the city and there are many more blue 
cabs (85%) than green cabs (15%) on the road at 
any given point in time. In a later test, the witness 
is found to be 80% accurate in distinguishing 
between blue and green cabs. With less than per-
fect witness accuracy, estimates that the cab was 
actually green should be well below 80% yet many 
individuals anchor their estimates at or near 80%. 
Hinsz et al. found that groups were even less likely 
than individuals to temper their estimates in the 
direction of  the base rate and were more likely to 
simply choose 80%. Smith, Tindale, and Steiner 
(1998) had individuals and five-person groups 
make investment decisions for “sunk cost” prob-
lems (problems where people tend to continue 
investing in a project that is failing because they 
have already invested a large amount of  money—
i.e., a “sunk cost”) and found that groups 
were equally likely as individuals to choose to put 
“good money after bad”. In addition, two-person 
minorities favoring continued investment were 
often persuasive against 3 person majorities 
favoring the opposite when they used sunk cost 
Table 2. Social Decision Scheme Models for Truth 
Wins and Truth-Supported Wins
Individual 
distributions
Group distributions
 Truth Wins Truth-Supported 
Wins
A–B A B A B
6–0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
5–1 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
4–2 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3–3 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
2–4 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
1–5 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
0–6 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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Figure 2. The probability of  the group choosing the 
correct alternative as a function of  individual choice 
probabilities for Truth Wins, Truth-Supported Wins 
and Proportionality Social Decision Schemes.
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arguments (e.g., “if  we stop now all that money 
went to waste”).
Much of  research on good vs. poor group 
performance has tended to argue that the differ-
ent performance outcomes are a function of  
inherently different processes (Brodbeck et al., 
2007; Janis, 1982). However, based on the work 
on shared preferences and shared representa-
tions, it is quite possible that many instances of  
poor performance are simply basic group pro-
cesses working in a context where they lead the 
group in a poor direction. The two poor perfor-
mance situations of  interest here would be those 
where larger factions tended to be wrong and the 
shared representation would favor the incorrect 
alternative. In other words, the same basic pro-
cesses that groups often use that lead to good 
performance outcomes can lead to poor out-
comes in certain contexts. The two studies we 
report here both demonstrate this basic idea. 
Groups making decisions using shared represen-
tations of  the task and how it should be 
approached, in conjunction with majority influ-
ence processes will lead to good outcomes when 
the representations aid in reaching good deci-
sions, but will lead to poor outcomes when they 
do not. Both good and poor performance by 
groups (i.e., better and worse than an individual 
performance baseline) will be demonstrated using 
two different task domains; syllogistic reasoning 
and probability estimation.
Study 1
Study 1 is a follow up to a study comparing indi-
vidual and group performance on syllogistic rea-
soning tasks across cultures where the premises 
were consistent or inconsistent with different cul-
tural beliefs (Smith et al., 2000). In the Smith et al. 
study, individuals and groups worked on 8 syllo-
gisms and were asked to judge whether the con-
clusion was valid or invalid. Half  of  the syllogisms 
had valid conclusions and the other half  had inva-
lid conclusions, based on formal, propositional 
logic. Generally, groups performed better than 
individuals and Japanese students performed bet-
ter than their American counterparts. However, 
there was one syllogism where Japanese groups 
performed substantially worse than individuals. 
This anomaly led us look more closely at that par-
ticular syllogism and we found that it was the only 
one we used that included the qualifier “some” in 
one of  the premises and in the conclusion (e.g., 
some A are B). In formal logic, saying “some A 
are B” merely insures that the categories are not 
mutually exclusive, but does not exclude other 
possibilities (e.g., that “all A are B” or “All B are 
A”). However, research has shown that people 
often assume via conversational norms (Grice, 
1975) that the inclusion of  “some” in the state-
ment implies more—e.g., that only some and not 
all are included (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). 
In further analysing the group discussions, it 
appeared that such misinterpretations of  the for-
mal logic definition of  “some A are B” led groups 
to perceive the syllogism’s conclusion as valid 
when it was not.
Misconstruing how the term “some” should 
be interpreted in formal logic should not always 
impede performance on syllogism problems. 
Syllogisms that use some in both a premise and 
the conclusion can be valid, and would be seen as 
valid even if  “some” were misinterpreted. Thus, 
misconstruing the implications of  “some” may 
actually aid in the correct evaluation of  a syllo-
gism under some circumstances. The current 
study attempted to assess whether this shared 
conversational norm would both aid and impair 
groups’ abilities to correctly evaluate the validity 
of  different syllogisms.
Method
Participants Participants were 522 undergrad-
uate introductory psychology students drawn 
from two Midwestern universities. Students par-
ticipated either as individuals (132) or as mem-
bers of  five-person groups. All participants were 
given course credit for their participation.
Materials and procedures Upon arrival at the 
lab, participants were randomly assigned to either 
the individual or group condition. In both 
conditions, participants first responded to eight 
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syllogistic reasoning problems as individuals. All 
eight problems included the qualifier “some” in 
one of  the premises and in the conclusion. Half  
of  the syllogism contained a valid conclusion that 
logically follows from the premises, for example:
All protesters are healthy for the country.
Some radical leftists are protestors.
Therefore, some radical leftists are healthy for 
the country.
Regardless of  whether the interpretation of  
the minor (second) premise implies “some are 
not”, the conclusion is still valid. The other half  
of  the syllogisms included a conclusion that did 
not logically follow from the premises, but 
appeared valid under certain logically-erroneous 
but conversationally-plausibe interpretations of  
what “some” means. For example:
Some immoral people are scientists.
All scientists are atheists.
Therefore, some atheists are not immoral.
For these syllogisms, erroneously assuming 
that “Some immoral people are scientists” implies 
that the two categories “immoral” and “scientists” 
overlap only partially (and, hence, that one could 
further assume that “Some immoral people are 
not scientists” or that “Some not immoral people 
are scientists”) leads to the appearance that the 
conclusion is valid. Half  of  the participants 
received the syllogisms in a pre-specified random 
order and the other half  received them in the 
reverse order. Participants responded to each syl-
logism’s conclusion using an eight-point scale 
ranging from 1 (absolutely invalid) to 8 (absolutely 
valid) with scale scores 3 and 4 labeled “perhaps 
invalid” and 5 and 6 labeled ”perhaps valid”.
Participants in the group condition worked on 
the eight syllogisms as a group and chose a score 
between 1 and 8 for each syllogism. Groups were 
told that they could reach their group decision in 
any way that they liked but that the final group 
response should reflect the groups’ collective 
opinion. Participants in the individual condition 
worked on an unrelated task during the times 
while groups worked on the problems. Following 
the group responses or the work on the unrelated 
task, all participants again rated the eight syllo-
gisms as individuals using the same response 
scale. Participants were told that these responses 
did not need to correspond to those they or their 
group had made before, but should reflect their 
current thinking on the problem. Following this 
final round, all participants were debriefed, 
thanked for their participation and excused from 
the experiment.
Results
For the four valid syllogisms, higher ratings were 
associated with better performance, while the 
opposite was true for the four invalid syllogisms. 
Thus, we reverse scored the invalid syllogisms so 
that higher ratings always defined better perfor-
mance. We then averaged the ratings for both 
individuals and groups across the four syllogisms 
of  each type. We then performed a 2 (group vs. 
2nd test individuals) by 2 (syllogism type: valid vs. 
invalid) analysis of  variance on the average scores. 
The means associated with condition are pre-
sented in Figure 3. The results showed a signifi-
cant main effect for the individual—group 
difference, F(1, 208) = 10.73, p < .01, partial η2 = 
.049, with groups (M = 4.86) performing better 
that individuals (M = 4.57). A significant main 
effect of  syllogism type was also found, F(1, 208) 
= 19.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .084, showing better 
performance for valid (M = 5.01) than invalid (M 
= 4.35) syllogisms. However, both main effects 
were qualified by a significant individual-group by 
type of  syllogism interaction, F(1, 208) = 16.36, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .073. As shown in Figure 3 
and collaborated with simple effects analyses, 
groups performed better than individuals for 
valid syllogisms, F(1, 208) = 22.08, p < .001, par-
tial η2 = .096, yet performed worse than individu-
als for invalid syllogisms, F(1, 208) = 6.46, p < .02, 
partial η2 = .030.1
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Two different approaches were used to assess 
aspects of  the group discussion and influence 
processes. First, Table 3 shows the observed social 
decision scheme matrices for both the valid and 
invalid syllogisms. The initial preference distribu-
tions are based on group members’ initial reponses 
scored as correct vs. incorrect as a function of  
whether their judgments were on the “correct” 
half  of  the scale (1–4 for invalid syllogisms and 
5–8 for valid syllogisms). Evidence for both fac-
tion size/majority processes and the effects of  
shared task representations are present. First, 
there were a greater number of  groups with 
majorities favoring the correct response for the 
valid (64%) as opposed to the invalid (55%) syl-
logisms. In addition, the correct majorities won 
93% of  the time for the valid syllogisms, but only 
55% of  the time for the invalid syllogisms. A key 
comparison between the different types of  syllo-
gisms can be seen for the groups where a correct 
three-person majority faced an incorrect two per-
son minority. For the valid syllogism, the majority 
prevailed 81% for the time, but for the invalid syl-
logisms, the majority won only 35% of  the time, 
χ2 (1, N = 143) = 33.55, p < .001, Φ = .48. Such 
differences tend to imply that the incorrect 
response was easier to defend for the invalid 
syllogisms.
The group discussions were also videotaped 
and coded for whether the groups discussed the 
meaning of  “some” in the context of  the syllo-
gisms (Cohen’s κ = .75).2 In all cases where some 
was mentioned, it was resolved consistent with 
conversational norms rather than formal logic 
(i.e., they always agreed that some implies some 
are not). For the valid syllogisms, when some was 
discussed, it improved group performance (93% 
correct) relative to when it was not discussed 
(64%), χ2 (1, N = 42) = 3.94, p < .05, Φ = .31. For 
invalid syllogisms, this trend was reversed, though 
not significantly so, with groups that mentioned 
some (14%) doing less well than group that did 
not mention some (32%),  χ2 (42) = 1.54, p > .05, 
Φ = .19.
The results generally showed that within the 
same problem domain, groups could perform 
both better and worse than individuals depending 
on whether their shared understanding of  the 
problems tended to help or hinder their perfor-
mance. In both cases, larger factions tended to 
win, but the larger factions were more likely to 
favor the correct alternative for valid syllogisms 
as compared to invalid syllogism. In addition, 
two-person minorities favoring the incorrect 
alternative were very unpersuasive for the valid 
syllogism, but two-person minorities favoring the 
incorrect alternative were quite persuasive for the 
invalid syllogisms. Thus, both group performance 
trends—above and below the individual base-
line—can generally be explained by basic pro-
cesses associated with shared preferences and 
shared representations of  the task.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Valid Invalid
Ra

ng
Type of Syllogism
Individual
Groups
Figure 3. Individual and group performance for 
valid and invalid syllogisms
Table 3. Observed Social Decision Schemes for valid 
and invalid syllogisms
Individual 
distributions
Group distributions
 Valid Invalid
C–I N C I N C I
5–0 38 1.00 0.00 25 0.72 0.28
4–1 92 0.96 0.04 62 0.73 0.27
3–2 64 0.81 0.19 79 0.35 0.65
2–3 72 0.65 0.35 77 0.42 0.58
1–4 34 0.41 0.59 50 0.24 0.76
0–5  3 0.00 1.00 11 0.09 0.91
C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number 
of  groups.
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Study 2
Study 2 is also an extension of  earlier research 
looking at group performance on tasks where 
individuals tend to apply simple but potentially 
inappropriate heuristics to probability estimation 
problems (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The task 
domain used involved estimating conjoint proba-
bilities, using the classic “Linda the feminist bank 
teller” problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Kahneman and Tversky had participants read a 
short description of  Linda, which described her 
as outgoing, athletic, extroverted, and liberal. 
Then they asked participants to estimate the like-
lihood that Linda would fall into various catego-
ries. One of  the questions asked participants to 
the likelihood that Linda was a bank teller, which 
tended to produce low estimates because it was 
not consistent with the stereotype created by the 
description. Another question asked for an esti-
mate for Linda being a feminist, which led to rela-
tively high judgments since it did fit the stereotype. 
A third question asked participants to estimate 
the likelihood that Linda was a “feminist bank 
teller”. Since feminist bank teller is, by definition, 
a subset of  bank tellers, probability theory argues 
that estimates for feminist bank teller should be 
less than or equal to estimates for bank teller. 
However, most people judged feminist bank 
teller as more likely than simply bank teller 
because it was a better “representation” of  the 
description of  Linda provided. Yates and Carlson 
(1986) found that people generally overestimate 
conjunction probabilities when one of  the com-
ponent parts is considered fairly likely. When 
both components are unlikely, the likelihood of  
making a conjunction error (overestimating the 
likelihood of  the conjunction) is drastically 
reduced. However, when both components are 
quite likely, the error rate is increased.
Our initial work comparing individuals and 
groups using problems modeled after the Linda 
problem showed that groups were more likely 
than individuals to make conjunction errors for 
those types of  conjunctions with high individual 
error rates, but make fewer errors than individu-
als for conjunctions with low error rates (Tindale 
et al., 1996). More recent research has shown that 
individuals are less likely to overestimate conjunc-
tions when they are familiar with the actual fre-
quencies associated with the components of  the 
conjunction (Gigerenzer & Hofferage, 1996). 
Thus, it is possible that groups might be less error 
prone when making judgments about categories 
that they have experience with or are knowledge-
able about. We also had the ability to videotape 
the group discussions in the current study which 
we were not able to do in our previous research.
Method
Participants Participants were 470 undergrad-
uate introductory psychology students drawn 
from two Midwestern universities. Students par-
ticipated either as individuals (122) or as mem-
bers of  four-person groups. All participants were 
given course credit for their participation
Materials and Procedures Upon arrival at the 
experiment, participants were randomly assigned 
to participate as individuals or members of  4- 
person groups. All participants then were then 
asked to read a short paragraph about a fictitious 
person and to make a series of  likelihood judg-
ments concerning that person as individuals. 
Likelihood judgments were made on 100-point 
scales where 0 = 0% likely and 100 = 100% likely. 
The paragraph and estimates were modeled after 
the “Linda” problem used by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983). Half  of  the participants 
(those in the unfamiliar condition) received a par-
agraph describing a generic male person with no 
particular relationship or relevance to the partici-
pants, much like Linda in the feminist bank teller 
problem. The description of  this person implied 
introversion, intelligence, and high business and 
mathematical abilities. The likelihood judgments 
about the person used these traits to define the 
likely and unlikely categories (e.g., social director 
at his condominium—unlikely; good chess 
player—likely). The other half  of  the participants 
received a paragraph describing a male student at 
the participants’ university (familiar condition). 
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This person was described as a typical student at 
the university and the likelihood judgments were 
based on categories that most students would 
know to be common or rare (e.g., from the Chi-
cago area—likely; a math major—unlikely). Par-
ticpants made nine likelihood judgments, of  
which three were used as the main dependent 
variables. Participants made likelihood judgments 
for 5 single categories, and also made estimates 
for three conjunction categories; two likely cate-
gories, one likely and one unlikely category, and 
two unlikely categories. Each of  the component 
parts of  the conjunctions were included in the 
five single category ratings. Thus we had partici-
pant ratings for each conjunction and their rat-
ings for each of  the component parts of  the 
conjunction.
Following the initial judgments, individual par-
ticipants worked on an unrelated task, while 
group participants were asked to make the nine 
likelihood judgments again but this time as a 
group. The groups were told that they could 
make their judgments in any way that they liked 
but the final group response should reflect the 
group’s collective opinion. After the groups fin-
ished making their group judgments and the indi-
viduals finished the unrelated task, participants 
again made individual likelihood judgments for 
the nine questions. Following this last set of  judg-
ments, the participants were debriefed, thanked 
for their participation, and excused from the 
experiment.
Results
Individual and group likelihood judgments for 
the three conjunctions were scored as correct or 
incorrect by comparing the likelihood judgment 
for the conjunction to the likelihood judgments 
for the two components of  the conjunction. The 
judgment was scored “correct” if  it was less than 
or equal to the lower of  the two component judg-
ments. Otherwise, it was scored an error. The 
final individual judgments and group judgments 
were subjected to a 2 (individual vs. group) by 2 
(familiar vs. unfamiliar case) x 3 (type of  conjunc-
tion: likely–likely (LL), likely–unlikely (LU), and 
unlikely–unlikely (UU)) repeated measures analy-
sis of  variance. The only effects that reached sig-
nificance were the main effect for conjunction 
type, F(2, 410) = 49.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .193; 
the conjunction type by individual-group interac-
tion, F(2, 410) = 17.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .081; 
the conjunction type by familiarity interaction, 
F(2, 410) = 6.17, p < .01, partial η2 = .029; and the 
conjunction type by individual-group by familiar-
ity interaction, F(2, 410) = 3.29, p < .05, partial η2 
= .016. In order to futher explore the three-way 
interaction, we ran three 2 (individual-group) x 
2(familiarity) analyses of  variance, one for each 
conjunction type. It appears that the three-way 
interaction stems mainly from the fact that there 
is a nearly significant individual-group by familiar-
ity interaction for the LU conjunction, F(1, 410) = 
2.98, p < .09, partial η2 = .008, but not for the UU, 
F(1, 410) = .084, p =.77, partial η2 < .001, or the 
LL F(1, 410) = .51, p = .48, partial η2 = .001.
As shown in Figure 4, groups (88% correct) 
generally performed better than individuals (72% 
correct) for the UU conjunctions (panel a), F(1, 
410) = 12.63, p < .001, partial η2=.034, but groups 
(35% correct) performed worse than individuals 
(51% correct) for the LL conjunctions (panel b), 
F(1, 410) = 8.46, p < .01, partial η2 = .023. However, 
for the LU conjunctions (panel c), groups per-
formed better than individuals only in the familiar 
condition (groups—80%; individual—59%), 
F(1, 410) = 5.06, p < .05, partial η2 = .047, and 
performed slightly worse (though not signifi-
cantly so) than individuals in the unfamiliar 
condition (groups—53%; individuals—59%), 
F(1, 410) = .31, p = .58, partial η2 = .003. Thus, 
familiarity only seemed to impact group judg-
ments when the unlikely component was com-
bined with a more likely component. Replicating 
past research, when both components were likely, 
groups exacerbated the error tendencies found at 
the individual level, but, when both components 
were unlikely, groups made fewer errors than 
individuals.
We once again looked at the group decision 
processes in two ways. First, as shown in Tables 4, 
5, and 6, we calculated the observed social deci-
sion schemes for groups in both the familiar and 
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Figure 4. Individual and group performance across familiarity conditions for (a) Unlikely–Unlikely,  
(b) Likely–Likely, and (c) Likely–Unlikely conjunctions.
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Table 5. Observed Social Decision Scheme matrices 
for both familiar and unfamiliar versions of  the 
Likely–Likely conjunctions
Individual 
distributions
Group distributions
 Familiar Unfamiliar
C–I N C I N C I
4–0  9 0.44 0568  0 – –
3–1  9 0.33 0.67  6 0.33 0.67
2–2 15 0.33 0.67  5 0.40 0.60
1–3  9 0.22 0.78 17 0.24 0.76
0–4  2 0.00 1.00 15 0.20 0.80
C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number 
of  groups.
Table 6. Observed Social Decision Scheme Matrices 
for both familiar and unfamiliar versions of  the 
Likely–Unlikely conjunctions
Individual 
distributions
Group distributions
 Familiar Unfamiliar
C–I N C I N C I
4–0 15 0.73 0.27  2 0.50 0.50
3–1 12 1.00 0.00 11 0.72 0.28
2–2 12 0.58 0.42 17 0.47 0.53
1–3  3 1.00 0.00  9 0.33 0.67
0–4  1 1.00 0.00  4 0.25 0.75
C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number 
of  groups.
Table 4. Observed Social Decision Scheme matrices 
for both familiar and unfamiliar versions of  the 
Unlikely–Unlikely conjunctions
Individual 
distributions
Group distributions
 Familiar Unfamiliar
C–I N C I N C I
4–0 12 0.92 0.08 15 1.00 0.00
3–1 13 0.92 0.08 15 1.00 0.00
2–2 13 0.85 0.15 10 0.70 0.30
1–3  4 0.75 0.25 2 1.00 0.00
0–4  1 0.00 1.00 0 – –
C = Correct Response; I = Incorrect Response; N = Number 
of  groups.
unfamiliar conditions for each type of  conjunc-
tion (UU, LL, and LU respectively).3 For the UU 
conjunctions (both familiar and unfamiliar, see 
Table 4), there were many more correct than 
incorrect majorities and correct minorities were 
often able to win over incorrect minorities. For 
the LLconjunctions in both familiarity conditions 
(see Table 5), the patterns were reversed. Across 
all observed member preference distributions, 
groups were more likely than not to make an 
error, and many more groups had majorities that 
had made errors as individuals. However, for the 
LU conjunctions (see Table 6), the patterns were 
somewhat different for the familiar and unfamil-
iar conditions. For the unfamiliar condition, there 
were approximately the same number of  majori-
ties favoring the correct and incorrect positions, 
and there was a very slight tendency for incorrect 
minorities to be more influential than correct 
minorities. However, for the familiar conjunc-
tions, there were many more groups with correct 
majorities and correct minorities tended to win. 
Thus, for the familiar LU conjunctions, both the 
shared preferences and the shared knowledge of  
the category frequencies tended to override the 
general tendency toward the conjunction error.
We also videotaped the group discussions and 
two independent coders coded them in terms of  
how groups seemed to reach consensus (κ = 
.69).4 Although five different categories emerged 
from the coding, two of  the categories encom-
passed 86% of  the groups that could be coded; 
group went with a single member’s response 
(60%), and group chose a compromise or rough 
combination of  two members’ responses (26%).5 
Table 7 shows the percentage of  correct 
responses for both familiar and unfamiliar condi-
tions for each conjunction type for groups cate-
gorized into these two consensus process 
categories. As can be seen in the table, these con-
sensus processes led to fairly good performance 
for the UU conjunctions regardless of  familiarity. 
These same processes led to fairly poor perfor-
mance for both familiar and unfamiliar LL con-
junctions. However, for the LU conjunctions, the 
processes led to fairly good performance in the 
familiar condition, but not for the unfamiliar 
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condition, although the differences between the 
familiarty conditions were only marginally signifi-
cant, χ2(1, N = 29) = 3.25, p < .10, Φ = .33. Thus, 
seemingly the same processes led to considerably 
different performance levels across the three 
types of  conjunctions, and for the LU conjunc-
tions, led to performance differences as a func-
tion of  familiarity.
General discussion
As previously noted, it is often assumed by both 
the popular press and many groups researchers 
that good vs. poor group performance varies as a 
function of  good vs. poor group processes (e.g., 
Janis, 1982). Although there is evidence that cer-
tain group process characteristics can lead to better 
or worse performance (Brodbeck et al, 2007; De 
Dreu, Nijstad, & von Kippenberg, 2008) our gen-
eral argument is that most groups probably do not 
display either particularly good or poor process, 
but rather typically function under fairly basic 
social processes, one of  which we refer to as social 
sharedness (Tindale & Kameda, 2000). Social shar-
edness tends to serve groups well in many com-
mon decision domains, as exemplified by the 
finding that groups often outperform individuals 
(Davis, 1969; Kerr & Tindale, 2011; Larson, 2010). 
However, in situations where shared knowledge is 
biased or inappropriate for a particular task, groups 
will tend to share preferences that are incorrect or 
suboptimal, yet in the group discussion, such pref-
erences will seem plausible even to members who 
did not favor them at the beginning of  the discus-
sion. In these situations, groups doing much of  
what they normally do will not produce the 
outcomes (superior performance) we typically 
expect from groups.
The results of  Study 1 showed that groups can 
both perform well and poorly on syllogistic rea-
soning tasks depending on whether their norma-
tive assumptions interfere with the formal logic 
underlying the problem. For those syllogisms 
where the conversational norm “stating the quali-
fier some implies that the categories only partially 
overlap” did not interfere with judging the syllo-
gisms validity, groups did perform better than 
individuals. However, for those syllogisms where 
the norm did interfere, the groups performed 
worse than individuals. Study 2 showed similar 
performance patterns for judging the likelihood 
of  conjunctive events. In those situations where 
the members’ basic tendencies led to lower judg-
ments (e.g., when both components were unlikely) 
groups performed better than individuals. 
However, when those basic tendencies led to 
high judgments (e.g., when both component 
likely), groups performed more poorly than indi-
viduals. Extending our previous research in this 
area, we also found that using categories with 
which the group members were familiar allowed 
groups, to a greater degree than individuals, to 
avoid conjunction errors when conjoining a likely 
and an unlikely category. It could be that the 
direct knowledge of  the size of  an unlikely cate-
gory makes it easier to construe the conjunction 
more appropriately and to make lower judgments 
seem more plausible. This greater plausibility may 
also affect how confident a particular member is 
in terms of  his/her initial estimate, which could 
increase the speed and intensity of  how the esti-
mate is presented to the group.
Table 7. Proportion of  correct group responses for groups using one of  two main judgment strategies by type 
of  conjunction and familiarity
Type of  conjunction Decision maker Familiar Unfamiliar
Unlikely–Unlikely Individual .61 .70
 Group .86 .93
Likely–Likely Individual .41 .39
 Group .34 .26
Likely–Unlikely Individual .59 .59
 Group .80 .55
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Even when we looked at group processes at a 
more fine grained level, we found that both good 
and poor performance could be produced by sim-
ilar processes. For the syllogism problems, dis-
cussing the meaning or implications of  premises 
and conclusions that contained the qualifier 
“some” always led to the resolution that some 
implies some are not. This extra scrutiny may have 
implied that the groups were attempting to use 
logic to solve the problems. When the resolution 
did not interfere with the logic of  the problem, 
the discussion appeared to improve performance. 
However, when the resolution did interfere, it led 
to poorer performance. For the conjunction task, 
two dominant consensus processes emerged: 
choose one members preference or merge prefer-
ences from two members. These processes were 
equally likely across all conditions, yet led to good 
performance for the UU conjunctions and poor 
performance for the LL conjunctions. In essence, 
many of  our groups in both studies were doing 
the same things, but those things were beneficial 
in some cases and not beneficial in others.
There are two possible conclusions one could 
take away from the research described here that 
would be incorrect.6 First, just because some of  
our groups performed rather poorly should not 
be used to argue that using groups to make 
important decisions is bad. The vast majority of  
research on group decision making and problem 
solving argues exactly the opposite: groups very 
often perform better, and rarely perform worse, 
than the level of  performance one would expect 
by a single individual (Larson, 2010). All our 
results show is that groups can make mistakes 
even when they are acting in ways that typically 
lead to good performance. In other words, groups 
do not have to fall prey to poor decision practices 
in order to perform poorly. Second, it would also 
be erroneous to assume that groups cannot be 
taught to perform in more optimal ways. Groups, 
on their own, will often perform well, but group 
training to insure good communication, trust, 
and an accurate shared model of  the task and the 
relevance of  the various member roles can pro-
duce substantial performance increments 
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; 
Weiner, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993). And train-
ing groups to watch out for task specific errors 
can be used to help groups adapt to environ-
ments where their typical responses are not 
effective (Paulus, Nakui, Putman, & Brown, 2006; 
Semmer, Tschan, Hunziker, & Marsch, 2011). 
Thus, although groups will typically do well, they 
can do better. We hope the studies presented 
here help to focus attention away from over- 
generalizations from past work (e.g., Janis, 1982) 
and to help to better isolate what factors truly are 
important for group performance.
Notes
The research reported here was funded by the follow-
ing grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR 
#9730822, SES #0136332, BCS #0621632, & BCS 
#0820344). Potions of  this article were drawn from 
the Midwestern Psychological Association’s Presiden-
tial Address (2008) by the first author. The authors rep-
resent four generations of  James Davis’ professional 
progeny as each later author began their careers as a 
student of  the preceding author and the first author 
was a student of  Jim’s
1  An analysis using the sum of  the number of  cor-
rect responses (any rating of  5 or greater for valid 
syllogisms and 4 or less for invalid syllogisms) 
produced the identical interaction and simple 
effects results.
2  Due to technical issues, particularly poor sound 
quality, only 42 of  the groups produced discus-
sions that could be reliably coded.
3  The numbers of  groups per row within each 
matrix in each condition were relatively small, so 
we did not attempt statistical comparisons between 
conditions.
4  Once again, technical difficulties limited to 41 
the number of  group discussions that could be 
reliably coded. Since each group estimated like-
lihoods for three conjunctions, we had 122 
cases (one group could not be coded for the LU 
conjunction) .
5  The other three categories were: Averaged the two 
component scores of  the conjunction (6%), cor-
rectly insured that the conjunction estimate was 
below both components (7%), and multiplied the 
two component estimates together (< 1%). 
Because of  their low numbers and because each 
of  these strategies, by definition, leads either to a 
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correct response or an error, we did not include 
them in the reported analyses.
6  We bring these up here because they are conclu-
sions that have been inferred by audience mem-
bers when we have presented these results at 
conferences.
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